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OUR (ALMOST) PERFECT CONSTITUTION 
Daniel A. Farber* 
I doubt that we would write the Constitution in quite the 
same way if we were to undertake the task afresh. Would anyone 
today actually propose giving the Providence metro area the 
same representation in one branch of the legislature as half the 
West Coast? Nor do I doubt that there are details of the Consti-
tution in need of improvement. (Like the sponsors of the sympo-
sium, I regard slavery as too obvious a failing to require 
discussion here). The interesting question is not whether the 
Constitution might not have been improved here or there. As 
with any human document, the answer is undoubtedly "yes."t 
But the more significant question is whether changes in the text 
would produce large practical benefits-or to put it another way, 
whether any parts of the Constitution (again putting aside slav-
ery) have produced major social harms. On this score, I am quite 
skeptical. 
The individual rights side of the Constitution is probably the 
easiest to deal with. No -doubt each of us can think of individual 
rights that should ideally be protected in the Constitution but are 
not mentioned there. Still, it is hard to identify any individual 
rights that are truly precluded from recognition by the constitu-
tional text. What prevents the judicial recognition of additional 
individual rights is usually not the text. Instead, it is the same 
thing that prevents their explicit incorporation into the Constitu-
tion: the lack of any strong national consensus in their favor. 
Liberals must be aware, for example, that the chances of getting 
the Supreme Court to recognize a constitutional right to welfare 
are just as small as getting Congress to pass such an amendment, 
and for roughly the same reason: most people in this country 
think the idea is nuts. On the other hand, if our society were 
really prepared to recognize such a right, Professors Michelman 
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1. To take perhaps a petty example, the "natural born citizen" clause of Article II, 
which prevents immigrants from aspiring to the Presidency, has always struck me as an 
unfortunate expression of nativism. 
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and Tribe pointed out some years ago how room could be found 
in the existing text. Thus, if there is an objection regarding the 
treatment of individual rights, it is not really to anything written 
in the Constitution, but rather to our constitutional culture. 
Much the same can be said about federalism. The extensive 
transformation of federal-state relations over our history shows 
just how much leeway the current Constitution allows in this re-
gard. The fundamental decision to encourage some forms of lo-
cal autonomy seems sound, and so is the equally fundamental 
decision to establish a unified nation. In the past two centuries, 
the balance between the two has shifted as our constitutional cul-
ture has changed, but most of the important changes have been 
extra-textual.2 
This brings us to the separation of powers, the area where 
the text is in many ways the most explicit. The fundamental deci-
sion here was to eschew a parliamentary form of government. At 
least since Woodrow Wilson, this decision has been roundly criti-
cized in some quarters. It seems less than obvious to me, how-
ever, that England or the continental European countries have 
been better governed on average than the United States. 
What about the details of the structure of government? The 
institution of party government has transformed the Framers' 
original expectations about how the system would work; here, 
political culture has turned out to mean more than original in-
tent. Hence, it is especially important in this setting to consider 
how the system has actually worked rather than merely the 
words in the document. 
The Senate seems most vulnerable to criticism, since it vio-
lates the general principle of "one person, one vote," which we 
otherwise endorse. It is true that in theory a small proportion of 
the population in strategic geographic locations could gain vastly 
disproportionate power through the Senate. Yet, this seems to 
have happened rarely if ever in our history; I cannot off-hand 
recall any instance of popular outcry against the "malapportion-
ment" of the Senate. 
In practice, Senators have not responded solely to the inter-
ests of their own states. Presidential elections have played an 
important role in ameliorating the problem-Senators have an 
interest in assisting their party to win in those contests, and his-
torically many Senators have themselves been aspiring Presiden-
2. The Reconstruction amendments are the exception that proves the rule. Even 
there, the critical shift of power to the national government during the Civil War and 
Reconstruction took place in the political (and ideological) arena. 
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tial candidates. Hence, Senators have tended to have a 
somewhat national, rather than purely local, outlook. Also, the 
longer terms served by Senators have probably encouraged them 
to take a Burkean view of their function, just as the Framers 
hoped. On balance, then, the Senate seems to have worked tol-
erably well. Indeed, if it had not, it quite likely would have suf-
fered the fate of the House of Lords by now. 
In short, the imperfections of the original text matter much 
less than what we have made of the Constitution over two centu-
ries. This conclusion could be considered an extension of the 
Coase Theorem. Constitutions do matter because they raise the 
transaction costs of enacting various legal measures. But in the 
long run, the rules cannot prevent the ultimate political balance 
of a society from working itself out, through amendments, judi-
cial interpretation, or new institutions such as political parties. In 
the end, society gets its way; if we dislike the results, we must put 
most of the blame on our contemporaries rather than the 
Framers. 
